Group Lending Model - A Panacea to Reduce Transaction Cost? by Sudhir Sharma et al.
49
Zagreb International Review of Economics & Business, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 46-63, 2017
© 2017 Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb and De Gruyter Open
All rights reserved. Printed in Croatia
ISSN 1331-5609; UDC: 33+65
DOI: 10.1515/zireb-2017-0017
* Sudhir Sharma, Priti Singh, Kratika Singh and Bhawana Chauhan are at the Department of Econom-
ics, Chaudhary Charan Singh University, Meerut (UP) India.
Group Lending Model 





Abstract: Microfinance institutions (MFIs) have stepped up towards commercialization and sustain-
ability yet they face challenges in terms of transaction cost that limit their growth pros-
pects. Transaction cost is incurred in forming the group of members, searching for the 
potential clients, monitoring, and administration, in providing training to the clients etc. 
Group lending has emerged as an effective tool in reducing this cost by transferring its 
burden on the group. Though the concept of group lending is not new in micro finance but 
in India it was introduced by NABARD in 2004-05 owing to its key advantage of income 
generation. This paper aims to analyze whether group lending programme has some role 
to play in reducing transaction cost of MFIs. It also discusses the concept of transaction 
cost, characteristics of group lending as well as process of forming a group. The results re-
veal that internal management of small and medium MFIs is not working efficiently which 
results in increased costs. Large MFIs do not face such problems. 
Keywords: Micro Finance Institutions; Transaction cost; Joint Liability Group
JEL Classification: O, O1, O10
Introduction
The formal financial institutions like Commercial Banks, Regional Rural Banks, and 
other institutions are hesitant in providing loans to poor as the latter carry high risk 
of non-repayment and are incapable of pledging any security against the loans pro-
vided. Such a resistance on the part of formal institutions necessitated the establish-
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ment of MFIs in India. The period of 1990s saw the emergence of MFIs intended 
for the sole purpose of providing loans to the poor through group lending system 
which acted as a substitute for collateral. Micro finance institutions provide both 
credit and non-credit products and are capable of reaching out to the vast section of 
poor people. MFIs have been taking progressive steps towards commercialization 
and sustainability. But they still face many impediments in terms of cost incurred 
in providing services to poor and this affect their efficiency and outreach1. One such 
cost is transaction cost. The cost can be defined as the cost of transferring resources 
between markets or between participants in the same market. In the field of finance, 
transaction cost refers to the resources required to transfer one unit of currency from 
the saver to a borrower, and recover that unit of currency at a later date with some 
agreed interest. Three types of costs are usually incurred by MFIs, namely, (i) in pro-
viding loans, (ii) on default, (iii) transaction cost. Transaction cost comprises the cost 
of identifying and screening the clients, processing the loan applications, completing 
the documentation, disbursing the loans, collecting repayments and following up the 
non-repayment (Savita Shankar, 2006). 
Each Micro finance institution operates under one of three models of microfi-
nance, namely, self- help group, joint liability group, and individual lending. Unlike 
self-help group, under which the sole motive to provide credit is to achieve self-sus-
tainability, JLG model helps clients to generate permanent source of income. Though 
individual lending is better model than SHG and JLG yet it suffers from the problem 
of increasing transactions costs with each lending. Under JLG model, this problem 
can be handled by transferring the burden on the group members.
Through group lending, MFIs can transfer transaction cost on group that ulti-
mately choose their own partner by gathering information about them and moni-
toring them. Different countries have adopted different versions of group lending 
programme best suited to their domestic environments. For instance, the solidarity 
group developed in Bolivia’s BancoSol or village bank in Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia. In India, MFIs provide loans through Joint Liability Group which is a replica of 
Group Lending Programme of Grameen bank, Bangladesh. In India, Joint Liability 
Group was introduced in 2004-05. Joint Liability Group is an informal group that 
comprises of 4-10 members who receive loans from the bank on the basis of group 
mechanism against mutual guarantees2. Members of JLG take up different types of 
economic activities mainly for income generation that uplifts their financial status 
and welfare. The problem of default is handled through their group lending system 
in which the entire group is denied any future loans till they repay the existing one. 
Further, Transaction costs in JLG are subjected to adverse selection, moral hazard, 
auditing cost and enforcement problem.
Section II of the paper discusses group formation methodology as well as basic 
concepts of transaction cost and group lending. Section III of the paper is associated 
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with objective and methodology. Lastly, Section IV discusses the result of the paper 
as well as limitations of the study.
Basic Concepts and Group Formation Methodology
Joint Liability Group model of Microfinance Institutions: Most of the microfinance 
institutions use Joint Liability Group model to provide micro finance to their clients. 
In this model, Compulsory Group Training (CGT) is conducted by the field staff to 
impart their clients with the knowledge about the nature of products, rules and reg-
ulations, policies and procedures and enable them to access the financial and social 
products. To enquire their knowledge levels, post training a Group Recognition Test 
(GRT) is conducted. This procedure helps the MFI staff in identifying the group of 
members who are interested in taking responsibility of each other and their credit 
absorption capacity. The detailed process of forming the group is as follows: 
The group lending process is segmented into five key phases: (1) Client Recruit-
ment & Application, (2) Compulsory Group Training & Group Recognition Test, (3) 
Group Loan Approval, (4) Disbursement & Customer Service, and (5) Collections & 
Recovery3. 
The first phase is Client Recruitment & application- In this phase, the information 
relating to different products is given to the clients in a simple and easy to understand 
language as most of them are either illiterate or less educated. The marketing ma-
terials, like pamphlets, of MFIs explicitly specify the eligibility criteria for getting 
loans, contact information, and instruction about how to register complaints, form 
groups and identify safe borrowers. Clients are well informed beforehand about the 
full cost of the products, interest rate, fees, terms, and condition of the loan including 
necessary documentation, any compulsory program, use of clients’ savings in the 
case of credit default, and use of clients’ data etc. The group guarantees mechanism 
helps in forming a group with reliable members. Members are made fully aware of 
their rights and responsibility, attendance, group behavior etc. if payment is delay, 
what is the process of loan recovery, results of over-indebtedness through distribution 
of pamphlets. While applying for group loans, they are provided all the information 
about the client consent forms and what liabilities they have to bear after signing it.
The second phase deals with the process of the application for and approval of 
loans. The field staff conducts Compulsory Group Training (CGT), Group Recog-
nizing Test (GRT) and visits the clients personally. CGT is conducted to acquaint 
clients with the information regarding loan products, filing complaints, importance 
of book entries, procedure of loan approval, evaluation of creditworthiness, learning 
about the repayment capacity of potential borrowers, handling the unethical behavior 
of staff, etc. The leader of the group is provided with special training to impart in 
him the skills related to cash management, to solve members’ disputes, to manage 
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members cordially, multiple borrowings’ policy of the MFI, handling of the mem-
bers’ grievances, etc. The staff indulges in explicit communication with the house-
holds regarding their current loan debt, product terms and conditions, verification of 
the assets claimed by them. This exercise helps the MFI to evaluate the repayment 
capacity of the borrowers. GRT is conducted to ascertain the understanding levels 
of the clients regarding the products and services, benefits, institutional policies and 
procedures, disciplinary issues and their responsibilities as a group member.
Phase three includes the task of financial analysis and data management. Though 
MFIs ignore the over-indebtedness of the clients, they make sure that the loan is giv-
en after considering the group guarantees mechanism and capacity to pay.
Phase four is related with disbursement of loans and customer services. MFIs 
verbally review important account information before opening a new account. The 
clients are provided with the documents that contain the information about rights 
and responsibility of the clients, groups and MFIs, repayment schedules, grievance 
redressal and collection practices. The clients are regularly updated with new infor-
mation regarding changes in the above mentioned documents, if any.
The fifth phase is related to the collection and recovery of loans. Collection meth-
ods are always mentioned in the loan contracts and thus, clients know how these 
methods work well before the approval of loan. The provision for counseling of the 
defaulters is also present which helps such clients with the difficulties faced in repay-
ment. The group leader also helps the MFIs in this process and it is assured that no 
force or any kind pressure is exercised.
Dimensions of Transaction Cost 
Transaction cost reflects the economic costs that organizations incur both internally 
and externally and is a way of measuring the efficiency of different institutions in a 
particular environment4. Transaction cost is incurred by the way of group develop-
ment costs, administrative costs and monitoring costs. Group development cost is in-
curred in innovating new products, training the clients, supporting group formation, 
etc. However, the proportion of cost incurred in training the clients is more in com-
parison to other factors since MFIs have to hire consultants for this purpose which 
doubles their costs. Secondly, MFIs incur administrative costs on debt collection, in 
appraisal and documentation of client’s loan application, in identifying and screening 
the clients and scrutinizing the potential clients. Further, administrative costs in-
cludes the cost of loan appraisal5, documentation6 (report and format completion, dis-
bursement, filling up expense claims for travel, bank related duties) and supervision 
(reporting to immediate supervisor, filling up movement registers). Finally, monitor-
ing cost is incurred in visiting the clients’ premises regularly, as compliance costs in 
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acquiring information and making agreements accordingly, formulating policies for 
enforcement and loan recovery investigation and regular disclosure of their periodi-
cal reports.) Monitoring costs includes cost of loan utilization checks and collection 
of installments7. In addition to the above costs, MFIs also bear transaction costs in 
designing credit contracts, engaging in screening of members of the group, assess-
ing project feasibility, evaluating loan applications, providing credit training to the 
staff and borrowers, and monitoring and enforcing loan contracts (B. Natamba, et.al 
2013). Transaction cost comprises both direct and indirect costs. While direct costs 
imply cost of screening and scrutinizing the potential clients, forming, administrat-
ing and monitoring the group lending program and, indirect costs are associated with 
rent, electricity and facility maintenance (Savita Shanker 2006). Since it is difficult 
to measure indirect transaction costs, certain proxies like uncertainty, transaction 
frequencies, asset specificity, opportunism, etc are used to quantify the same. High 
average costs are borne by MFIs even for the small-sized loans making it hard to 
achieve efficiency, outreach, and financial viability.
Role of Group Lending
Transaction cost is a part of all costs borne by MFIs. Some of these costs are the 
product of asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral hazard) on the part 
of these institutions, enforcement and auditing processes. MFIs follow a screening 
mechanism to identify the potential clients and accordingly design an optimal loan 
contract to reduce the risk involved. The difficulties faced in acquisition of informa-
tion related to the clients have led MFIs to choose their members for the group all by 
themselves. This helps in mitigating the risk of default since clients possess more ac-
curate information about their member partners than MFIs. Further, knowing the fact 
that all members share the equal liability to repay on default, it leads clients to choose 
good risk members. Moreover, the screening mechanism helps the MFIs in identify-
ing the low risk and high risk borrowers. The low risk borrowers opt for group loans 
with low interest rates and high risk borrowers opt for individual loans bearing high 
interest rates. Penalties are also imposed on the group if they default deliberately. In 
case of full information, risky borrowers are not chosen8. 
Though different norms of joint liability model help in mitigating the risk of non- 
repayment yet the prevalence of asymmetric information make it difficult to identi-
fy potential borrowers in the first place. The contractual arrangements don’t work 
because the borrowers are too poor to be imposed upon with financial sanctions by 
MFIs. Thus, the provision of joint liability can achieve better screening to contend 
with adverse selection, encourages peer monitoring to reduce moral hazard, gives 
group members incentives to enforce the repayment of loans, and reduces the lender’s 
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audit costs for cases where some group members claim not to be able to repay9. Social 
collateral too acts as a backup plan for enforcing repayment. 
In group lending system, it is the clients  who bear the cost of screening the po-
tential group members, group formation, negotiation with the lender, filling out nec-
essary paperwork, transportation of and from the lending agency, time spent on proj-
ect appraisal and meetings, monitoring group activities, and enforcing group rules10. 
Following this model works in favor of MFIs as the burden of cost is shifted onto the 
members of the groups.
Role of Group Leader
One of the members from the group is appointed as the group leader-a position for 
which anyone from the group can volunteer. The group leader may have different 
tasks to perform. Group leader’s responsibilities give him/her an advantage in ac-
quiring information regarding the reputation, effort levels, indebtedness, wealth, and 
other related aspects of the rest of the group members. Because the leader has to 
function as the group’s representative and update the loan officer about any repay-
ment difficulties, this could also intensify his/her incentives to enforce repayment. 
Apart from this intermediary effect, there may also be pressures arising due to the 
size of the leader’s liability. However, the group leader usually is the intermediary 
between the group and the program staff, who regularly reports to the program’s staff 
on the performance and sustainability of the group. Moreover, the group leader usu-
ally chairs group meetings, collects the installment payments from group members 
and transfers them to the credit officer, visits group members regularly and discusses 
business- and/or group-related problems, and calls for extra group meetings if repay-
ment problems occur. Again, depending on the characteristics of the group lending 
program, group leaders may or may not be paid for their activities11.
If being a leader does not confer any financial privileges, why would a borrower 
volunteer to be a group leader? There are four possible answers to this question. 
Firstly, in some cases, a member becomes a leader simply because someone has to 
fill this position implying that being a group leader is not purely voluntary. Secondly, 
becoming a group leader is seen to be a way of gaining social status within the group, 
among the pool of borrowers at the microfinance institutions, and within the staff of 
the microfinance institution. The fact that the group leader interacts and coordinates 
with group members, deals with the staff of the microfinance program, and may meet 
with other group leaders can be a source of happiness and pride for him/her. Thirdly, 
in some cases, the person who becomes the leader is the same person who has intro-
duced the group lending program and its benefits among the members of the group. 
He/ she naturally become the obvious choice. Fourth, a member may volunteer for 
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leadership to guarantee good repayment. Repayment of the current loan is neces-
sary for the group in order to get the next group loan. If one member is concerned 
about possible repayment difficulties, this member may volunteer for leadership if 
she thinks she has the right attributes that help in improving group repayment12.
Objectives and Methodology
The objective of the study is to analysis the role of group lending in reducing trans-
action cost of the MFIs. 
The time period of the study is from 2011-12 to 2014-15 and secondary data is 
used to conduct it. The data is acquired from the “Microscope Issue 2014-15” pub-
lished by Micro Financial Institutions Network. In order to analyze the relationship 
between transaction cost and efficiency of MFIs we have used multiple regression 
model. To run multiple regression, SPSS software version 20 has been used in this 
paper. Administrative expense and personnel expense, that define the transaction 
cost, are taken to be dependent while Operating Self-Sufficiency (OSS), Clients per 
Employee (CPE), Clients per Loan Officer (CPO), Clients per Branch (CPB), Gross 
Loan Portfolio per Employee (GPE), Gross Loan Portfolio per Branch (GPB), Gross 
loan portfolio per officer (GLPO) being the independent variables are used as the 
indicators of the efficiency and productivity of a MFI. Among the independent vari-
ables, Operating Self-Sufficiency indicates the financial efficiency and the remaining 
variables are the indicators of the staff productivity in the MFIs. Productivity of the 
staff has a positive impact on the Operational Self Sufficiency. Clients per loan offi-
cer represent number of active clients on per loan officer who is field officer. As CPO 
increases to the optimal levels it reduces the transaction cost of the MFIs. Clients 
per employee indicate the efficient working of the internal management in the MFIs. 
The extent of transparency and the use of appropriate strategies in extending loan 
define this efficiency. Other indicators GPB, GPLO and GPB indicate that available 
loan amount managed by employee and officer for disbursement. Personnel expense 
includes the staff salaries, bonus, benefits or staff expense while administrative ex-
penses includes specialized training to their existing employees. Microfinance Insti-
tutions are categorized as small, medium and large MFIs on the basis of Gross Loan 
Portfolio13. 
In the first step, a linear regression is performed individually on each variable. In 
the next step, to run multiple regression, the variables with higher values of R2 were 
selected. Variable showing second next high R square is then added to the selected 
variables to check for the improvement in the value of R2. The process is continu-
ously repeated until those variables which have majorly contributed in explaining 
transaction cost are obtained.
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In the study, linear regression is used with mathematical form of:
    Y1 =b0+b1X (1)
    Y2= b0+b1X (2)
Where Y1 refers transaction cost of the MFIs i.e. Administrative Expenses; X 
represents independent variables and beta is related with Administrative Expenses. 
Y2 also represent transaction cost of MFI in terms of Personnel Expenses; X refers 
independent variables and beta is associated with personnel expenses.
In next step, multiple regression is used with mathematical form of:
                  Y1 = b0+b1X1+b2X2+b3X3+..........+bkXk (3)
                  Y2 = b0+b1X1+b2X2+b3X3+..........+bkXk (4)
Where Y1 represent transaction cost of the MFIs i.e. Administrative Expenses 
while X1, X2, X3.......Xk represent independent variables such as OSS, CPE, CPO, 
CPB, GPE, GPB, and GPLO and beta is associated with Administrative Expenses.
Where Y2 represent transaction cost of the MFIs i.e. Personnel Expenses while X1, 
X2, X3.......Xk represent independent variables such as OSS, CPE, CPO, CPB, GPE, 
GPB, and GPLO and beta is associated with Personnel Expenses.
The Hypothesis of this study is as follows:
H0:  There exists a relationship between transaction costs and the independent 
variables selected for the study.
In this study, the presence of multicollinearity among the independent variables is 
also tested using Frisch’s Confluence Analysis (or Bunch-Map Analysis).
After performing multiple regression, it was found that three out of seven vari-
ables were superfluous. These variables are: 
In case of small MFIs: in the context of administrative expenses- CPB, CPE, OSS
  in context of personnel expenses- CPE, CPO, CPB
In case of medium MFIs: in context of administrative expenses- CPO, CPB, OSS
  in context of personnel expenses- CPB, CPE, OSS
In case of large MFIs: in context of administrative expenses- GPE, CPB, OSS
  In context of personnel expenses- OSS, GPE, GPB
Hence, these variables were dropped to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. 
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Results and Discussion
The results of this study are illustrated in six tables. For small, medium and large 
MFIs, Tables 1 to 3, contain results for personnel expenses and table from 4 to 6 
contain results for Administrative Expenses for the same. The results show that the 
value of R square is 1. This implies that the independent variables fully explain the 
variation in the dependent variables of this study.
Seven independent variables were selected to conduct this study, namely, Opera-
tional Self Sufficiency (OSS), Clients per Employee (CPE), Clients Per Loan Officer 
(CPO), Clients per Branch (CPB), Gross loan portfolio per Employee (GPE), Gross 
loan portfolio per officer (GLPO), Gross loan portfolio per branch (GPB). Out of 
these variables, only four variables have the most effect on transaction cost for all 
small, medium and large MFIs However, these four variables are different for every 
category of MFIs. 
Table 1 and 4, for small MFIs show that Administrative Expenses are highly af-
fected by GPB that is reducing transaction cost and with increase in GPE transaction 
cost is increases. Other variables such as GPLO and CPO also contribute in reducing 
Transaction cost but effect is minor. Whereas in terms of personnel expenses small 
MFIs is experiencing positive effect in terms of GPB and GPE where GPB has large 
impact while GPLO and OSS have minor effect in increasing transaction cost.
Table 2 and 5, for Medium MFIs; shows that GPLO, GPE and CPE have nega-
tive impact on Administrative Expenses but GPB has contributed more in reducing 
Transaction Cost. On the other hand, with increase in GPB, GPE and CPO, Personnel 
Expenses also increases where GPB have more effect. Only GPLO has contributed in 
reducing transaction cost.
For large MFIs, Table 3 and 6 shows that with increase in GPLO, administrative 
cost reduces while with increase in GPB, AE increases. This shows that large MFIs 
are expanding their operations and largely focusing on hiring professionals to train 
their staff as well as clients. In terms of Personnel Expenses, all variables have mi-
nor effects on transaction Cost. Out of these, increase in GPLO and CPO reduces 
transaction cost of large MFIs. This shows that large MFIs have efficient internal 
management. It also implies that large MFIs are expanding their operational areas, 
get large amounts of funds from national as well as international sources due to 
strong credit ratings, conducting training programmes, etc. which leads to higher 
transaction cost.
Finally, it can be interpreted from the results that the efficient size for operation of 
MFIs is medium size. Since small MFIs suffers from technological constrains, less 
funds at disposal, low level of training of the staff, internal mismanagement, poor 
credit ratings etc., they fail to achieve operational self sufficiency and incur higher 
transaction cost. The large MFIs, on the other hand, also don’t qualify for the optimal 
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size of operations as they incur higher transaction cost owing to increased outreach 
and other costs. 
Though the large MFIs are efficient in the technical and operational front, the 
factors like the provision of training to the newly appointed staff, large funds at their 
disposal, increasing outreach, etc., increases their transaction costs. 
Table 1: Small Microfinance Institutions
Variables Combined R Squares Unstandardized Beta Standardized Beta




NOTES: (Transaction Cost refer to Administrative Expenses in respect of independent variables such as Gross Loan 
Portfolio per officer (GPLO), Gross loan Portfolio Per Branch (GPB), Gross loan portfolio per Employee (GPE), 
Clients Per Officer (CPO)
(Table 1) Equation: Y= -.109(GPLO) -1.780(GPB) +.445(GPE) -.013(CPO)
Source: Microfinance Institutions Network. “The Micro Scape” 2014-15
Table 2: Medium Microfinance Institutions 
Variables Combined R Squares Unstandardized Beta Standardized Beta




NOTES: (Transaction Cost refer to Administrative Expenses in respect of independent variables such as Gross Loan 
Portfolio per Officer (GPLO), Gross loan Portfolio Per Branch (GPB), Gross loan Portfolio Per Employee (GPE), 
Clients per Employee (CPE)
(Table 2) Equation: Y= .005(GPLO) – 11.385(GPB) + .459(GPE) + .030(CPE)
Source: Microfinance Institutions Network. “The Micro Scape” 2014-15
Table 3: Large Microfinance Institutions
Variables Combined R Squares Unstandardized Beta Standardized Beta




NOTES: (Transaction Cost refer to Administrative Expenses in respect of independent variables such as Gross 
Loan Portfolio per officer (GPLO), Gross loan Portfolio Per Branch (GPB), Clients Per Officer (CPO), Clients per 
Employee (CPE)
(Table 3) Equation: Y= -.680(GPLO) + 9.465(GPB) + .068(CPO) - .043(CPE)
Source: Microfinance Institutions Network. “The Micro Scape” 2014-15
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Table 4: Small Microfinance Institutions 
Variables Combined R Squares Unstandardized Beta Standardized Beta




NOTES: (Transaction Cost refer to Personnel Expenses in respect of independent variables such as Gross Loan 
Portfolio per officer (GPLO), Gross loan Portfolio Per Branch (GPB), Gross loan portfolio per Employee (GPE), 
Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS)
(Table 4) Equation: Y=1.833(GPLO) -48.227(GPB) -.948(GPE) +.252(OSS)
Source: Microfinance Institutions Network. “The Micro Scape” 2014-15
Table 5: Medium Microfinance Institutions
Variables Combined R Squares Unstandardized Beta Standardized Beta




NOTES: (Transaction Cost refer to Personnel Expenses in respect of independent variables such as Gross Loan 
Portfolio per officer (GPLO), Gross loan Portfolio Per Branch (GPB), Gross loan portfolio per Employee (GPE), 
Clients Per Officer (CPO)
(Table 5) Equation: Y= -.668(GPLO) + 14.337(GPB) + .064(GPE) + .014(CPO)
Source: Microfinance Institutions Network. “The Micro Scape” 2014-15
Table 6: Large Microfinance Institutions
Variables Combined R Squares Unstandardized Beta Standardized Beta




NOTES: (Transaction Cost refer to Personnel Expenses in respect of independent variables such as Gross Loan 
Portfolio per officer (GPLO), Clients per Officer (CPO), Clients Per Employee (CPE), Clients per Branch (CPB)
(Table 6) Equation: Y= -.072(GPLO) - .048(CPO) + .019(CPE) + .002(CPB)
Source: Microfinance Institutions Network. “The Micro Scape” 2014-15
Limitation of the study: We have grouped the MFIs into three categories i.e., 
small, medium and large MFIs. The efficiency of MFIs is not analyzed individually 
due to non-availability of data.
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Conclusion
In this paper it was found that group lending model helps in reducing transaction 
costs better than other models of microfinance. The group lending model eliminates 
the intermediary role of field officer between the MFIs and clients which perhaps 
helps in such reduction. Moreover, the direct link between the branch and clients help 
these institutions to better understand their clients’ needs and improves operational 
efficiency. Also, incurring high transaction costs by MFIs necessitates the adoption 
of new and innovative techniques. Technology plays an important role in managing 
information system, cash handling and data capturing. Due to the low connectivity to 
the rural areas, MFIs resort to taking help of telecom companies and internet service 
providers to overcome this problem. Other devices can be used to reduce transaction 
cost of the MFIs such as low cost ATMs, low cost computing devices, mobile and 
internet based transaction platforms etc. MFIs have started using the advanced tech-
nology in their delivering methods but they still fail to reach their goal of achieving 
self-sustainability. There is need to build up a strong management information sys-
tem to scale up the operation of the MFIs. There challenges include high cost and 
limited availability of existing technological solutions, lack of widely available local 
technical support to support Management Information System software, consumer 
adoption rate of technology, lack of basic communication infrastructure and inad-
equate policy environment. Improved technology will lead to more transparency in 
delivering financial services. As a consequence, low costs would be incurred and 
access to clients earning low income would increase. Use of Point of Sale (POS) 
devices and branchless banking strategies will result in reduction in personnel and 
administrative expenses. Biometric technology, which requires individual’s unique 
physical or behavioural characteristics and voice pattern for confirming the identity, 
can also be used to lower the expenses.
These above mentioned measures, when followed, would help MFIs to lower their 
transaction costs and step up on the path of self-sustaining and operational efficiency. 
APPENDIX
Adverse selection: Considering the fact that furnishing the small-sized loans implies 
incurring high transaction cost, MFIs abate this cost by following the group lending 
model. Unlike individual model, this reduces the cost per loan. Post training, the 
potential clients become eligible to form their own groups after checking for their 
creditworthiness. This helps reducing the cost of screening the members, processing 
and collecting loans after maturity. Safe borrowers will ultimately end up with the 
safe ones since they would be more credible than the risky ones. Each member of 
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the group possesses the information about the creditability of the others owing to the 
social ties that binds them all. This further helps in reducing the risk of default in 
future. Due to this assortative matching, MFI offers two types of loan contracts- (i) 
in which safer borrowers choose high joint liability with low interest rate thus in-
creasing the repayment rate (ii) in which riskier borrowers choose low joint liability 
matched with high interest rates. 
Moral hazard: Monitoring the groups’ activities after providing loans results in 
lowering the costs that may arise from moral hazard on the part of clients. The bor-
rowers may take up the projects without carrying out the cost-benefit analysis. The 
problem of moral hazard surfaces when the loan is used for activities other than 
mentioned in the contract. However, ex post moral hazard relates to the strategic de-
fault, i.e., defaulting deliberately even when the current project is doing well. It may 
also result when one of the members default just to avoid the responsibility of other 
members. Though there is a provision of imposing non-monetary penalties within 
the groups, it is highly recommended that MFIs should also keep a check on such 
defaulters. 
Auditing cost: These costs come into picture when the borrowers default inten-
tionally. They are incurred in verifying the authenticity of the reasons behind such 
delinquency. Considering that in group lending model all the members bear equal 
liability in case of default MFIs are assured of repayment. 
Enforcement problem: In some cases, even after auditing, the members of the 
groups don’t repay despite of getting high payoffs from their projects. It is then when 
enforcement problem comes into light. The option of imposing penalties cannot be 
exercised on the already poor members. Hence, this problem is survived by enforcing 
them to repay through peer pressure and social sanctions i.e., exercising ostracism 
on the defaulter. Such sanctions can be more severe in close-knit poor communities 
where people rely on each other in their daily lives, and, to an even larger extent, in 
the time of distress.
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